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How do small ‘non-compliant’ ﬁrms (those evading existing regulations) react to further
regulatory change? The impact of the National Living Wage in the UK in 2016 is anal-
ysed through 22 mostly longitudinal case studies of small non-compliant ﬁrms. The varied
responses, endurance of non-compliance, and blurred and dynamic nature of transitions
to compliance are discussed through the lens of institutional approaches to informality.
The analysis sheds new light on the relative autonomy of micro processes and the condi-
tions under which external forces affect these processes. Non-compliant informality, as
a persisting feature of small business, is unlikely to be transformed by legal regulation
alone.
Introduction
The understanding of the ‘informal economy’ has
improved substantially since Webb et al.’s (2009)
seminal contribution. In particular, informality is
multidimensional. Firms may not comply with
formal legal regulations and yet be seen as le-
gitimate by their stakeholders and thus be dis-
tinct from both the formal and the renegade (il-
legal and illegitimate) sectors. Webb et al. (2009)
distinguished between the two axes of business
‘ends’ and ‘means’, and between formal institu-
tions, deﬁning legality, and informal ones, deﬁning
legitimacy. Darbi, Hall and Knott (2018) added
another axis, the degree of organizational infras-
tructure. These distinctions have important im-
plications for policy and practice, as Webb et al.
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(2009) propose that businesses combining legal
ends (products or services) with illegal (but per-
ceived as legitimate) means are those most likely
to transition to the formal economy, in contrast to
those with the aim of providing legal products in
forms, such as untaxed or counterfeited, that are il-
legal. Businesses with legal ends and illegal means,
which we describe as practising ‘non-compliant in-
formality’, provide a key way of examining the
boundaries between formality and informality and
the conditions necessary for formalization.
A key limitation of institutional views such as
Webb et al.’s is the presentation of the informal
economy as the direct outcome of a gap between
the macro (laws and regulations) and the meso
(sets of norms that prescribe what is acceptable in
a given context). If businesses sharing the same
formal and informal contexts behave differently,
additional factors and processes need to be con-
sidered. We focus on such processes in our study
of how non-compliant ﬁrms respond to a major
labour market intervention in the UK, namely the
introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW)
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in 2016. Our conceptual approach extends the pre-
vailing emphasis onmeso-level studies of the infor-
mal economy (that is, the norms, values and beliefs
of informal institutions; North, 1991). We iden-
tify a broader set of meso-level institutions that
matter to non-compliant ﬁrms, notably sectoral es-
tablished practices and networks (such as associa-
tions and agencies providing advice and support),
and non-institutional factors, namely the chang-
ing power relations in the market and in the work-
place. These relations are in turn shaped but not
determined by conditions in the product and the
labour markets (Edwards and Ram, 2006; Kloost-
erman, 2010). We pay particular attention to the
dynamics within ﬁrms at the micro level that create
and sustain informal practices, including the so-
cial relations between owners, workers and other
relevant actors (that is, the ‘labour process’). It is
the relative autonomy of the labour process from
external pressures that is key, as long stressed in
the ﬁelds of industrial relations and sociology of
work (Burawoy, 1979; Edwards et al., 2006; Ram,
1994; Ram andEdwards, 2003, 2010).We therefore
advance an integrated approach comprising social
relations within the workplace, a wider range of
meso-institutions that encompass the sectoral con-
text of ﬁrms, and macro-level regulatory change.
Using this approach, we ask ‘how do managers in
non-compliant small ﬁrms react to major regula-
tory change?’ We cast light on neglected issues, in-
cluding the durability of the ‘informal economy’,
selective compliance, and why and how some ﬁrms
move into formality (Darbi, Hall and Knott, 2018;
Webb and Ireland, 2016).
The terms ‘informal economy’ and ‘informality’
need clariﬁcation, not least because the latter is a
widely noted feature of small ﬁrms per se (Edwards
et al., 2006), but is sometimes mistakenly conﬂated
with the evasion of statutory regulations. The ‘in-
formal economy’ is an imprecise term with a vari-
ety of meanings. We view it as the paid production
and sale of goods and services that are unregistered
by, or hidden from, the state for tax and welfare
purposes, but which are legal in all other respects
(Williams, 2004). This deﬁnition distinguishes the
informal economy from, on the one hand, the for-
mal sector and, on the other hand, unpaid work
and monetary transactions involving illicit goods
and services. We deﬁne ‘informality’ as a pro-
cess of workforce engagement, collective and/or
individual, based mainly on unwritten customs
and the tacit understandings that arise out of the
interaction of the parties at work (Ram et al.,
2001). As such, informality is a dynamic rather
than a ﬁxed characteristic, and is highly con-
text speciﬁc. This deﬁnition embraces ﬁrms that
are compliant with regulations, as well as those
that are non-compliant. Our interest is in ‘non-
compliant informality’, that is, ﬁrms in breach of
formal regulations (in particular, the NLW).
We draw on 22 (mainly longitudinal) case stud-
ies of non-compliant small ﬁrms to examine how
managers handle the major regulatory change of
the NLW. Such a change in regulatory institutions,
involving both an increased cost of compliance
(higher minimum wage rates) and increased risk
(new enforcement mechanism), could lead to
different outcomes, from increased compliance
to increased illegality. At the same time, we keep
relatively constant the meso-level institutions
that explain the perceived legitimacy of informal
practices, by focusing on one geographic area
and on a narrow cultural and ethnic setting,
while we construct a sample with a wide variation
of sectoral economic and workplace dynamics,
as well as changing economic conditions over
time. The ﬁndings reveal considerable variety of
practice, a blurred and ﬂuid relationship between
formal and informal institutions, and tensions
within ﬁrms belying the meso-level emphasis on
shared norms: a more complex pattern than the
idea of meso-institutions reproducing shared
norms based on the legitimacy of non-compliance
would suggest. Where compliance has occurred,
dynamics within the ﬁrm, as well as shifts in the
macro and meso-environment, are an important
part of the explanation. For most non-compliers
there is striking heterogeneity, including surpris-
ingly many successful and dynamic performers.
Only a tiny minority conform to the stereotypical
depiction of the hidden struggler.
The opportunity to examine ﬁrms studied 10
and/or 20 years previously allows us to identify
the roots of both enduring non-compliance and
transitions to formality. The inclusion of workers
is theoretically signiﬁcant as well as methodologi-
cally distinctive because, despite no claim of work-
force representativeness, it allows for an examina-
tion of both parties’ values and norms (meso-level
normative institutions), and the dynamics of con-
sent and conﬂict in the workplace; in other words,
it shows how managers and employees ‘co-create
and enact their contexts, draw on their cognitions
and individual interpretations of contexts and
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contribute to changes over time’ (Baker and
Welter, 2018: 386).
Theoretical background and
controversies
Mainstream management studies tend to portray
formality as a ‘superior approach to the organiza-
tion of economic life’ (Godfrey, 2016: 8). The ne-
glect of the ‘informal economy’ is being rectiﬁed
(Bruton, Ireland and Ketchen, 2012; Darbi, Hall
and Knott, 2018; Godfrey, 2011, 2016; McGahan,
2012; Webb and Ireland, 2016; Webb et al., 2009).
Its enduring relevance is highlighted by empirical
work in the UK (Hammer and Plugor, 2016; Ram,
Edwards and Jones, 2007). Clark and Colling’s
(2017) study of the UK’s hand car wash sector
is a recent example of an informal economy that
is growing, rather than receding. A recent esti-
mate suggests that the informal economy in Eu-
rope ranges from 7.1% of private sector employ-
ment in Germany to 27.3% in Poland, reaching
9.1% in the UK (Williams et al., 2017). Informal
work is, however, a much broader phenomenon
than informal output, as formally employed work-
ers may have all or part of the key dimensions of
their employment (notably their pay and working
time) set in informal ways that do not conform to
formal regulations.
Darbi, Hall and Knott (2018) accept the po-
sition of earlier writers like Castells and Portes
(1989) that what we term ‘non-compliant infor-
mality’ remains integral to the advanced economy:
irregular activities of small ﬁrms achieve substan-
tial cost cutting for their corporate customerswhile
sparing the latter from the risks of breaching reg-
ulations themselves. But Darbi, Hall and Knott
(2018) continue to refer to the ‘two sectors’ of for-
mality and informality as if these were separate en-
tities, and even identify a whole suite of ‘atypical’
management practices that appear to characterize
the latter. This ignores evidence on such a false
binary (Williams, 2004, 2006), with the majority
of small enterprises in the UK economy display-
ing varying degrees and dimensions of informality
(compliant and non-compliant).
The implication of such hybridity is that ﬁrms
should not be expected to respond to the NLW
and other regulations in wholly informal and un-
structured ways. They will have their own ways of
behaving, which may be well entrenched, and can-
not entirely ignore the regulatory environment in
which they operate. But there will be a process
of adjustment in which informality is important
(Ram and Edwards, 2003). It is the ‘relative in-
determinacy of rules that provides scope for their
necessary adaptation in the process of implemen-
tation to suit practical circumstances and local
contexts’ (Picciotto, 2002: 9). Battisti and Deakins
(2018) make a similar point in their study of the
tax compliance behaviour of small business own-
ers. Firm ownersmay adhere to the letter and spirit
of regulations, or they can ﬁnd ways of adapting to
the rules without complying with their objectives
(Braithwaite, 2002: 4).
As for the origins of informality, some stress
the structural disadvantages that push ﬁrms to cut
costs (Castells and Portes, 1989), whilst others lo-
cate the problem in the mere existence of state
regulations (De Soto and Taylor, 2011). Williams
(2004, 2014) sees both perspectives as reduction-
ist: non-compliant informality arises out of a mul-
tiplicity of causal forces, ranging from structural
disadvantage to various benign motivations such
as ‘paid favours’ for neighbours and kin. Such
multiple causes mean that informality, far from
naturally receding in concomitance with mod-
ernization, can also expand, as with the emer-
gence of new informal and casualized employment
practices such as the recent expansion of ‘bogus
self-employment’ (Taylor, 2017). The persistence
of non-compliant informality points to powerful
forces of inertia. Many small ﬁrm owners remain
resistant to compliance with official wage regu-
lation; they see themselves as the best judges of
what a worker is worth and are often unaware
of the increasing likelihood of legal penalties. As
De Castro, Khavul and Bruton (2014) stress, non-
compliant employers are less concerned with legal
regulations than with what their peer group net-
work deems to be ‘socially acceptable’ (Webb et al.,
2009; see also Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck et al., 2015;
Siqueira, Webb and Bruton, 2016; Welter, Small-
bone and Pobol, 2015). Alongside this there re-
mains a degree of collusion by workers, many of
whom continue to treat the security and ‘family
atmosphere’ of the small workplace as compen-
sation for low wages (Jones, Ram and Edwards,
2006; Ram, Edwards and Jones, 2007). Such ten-
dencies are particularly likely in ethnic minority
ﬁrms, where family and kinship ties are strong. Yet
ethnicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for non-
compliance to occur (Ram and Edwards, 2003).
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Theoretically, the main explanation of the dura-
bility of non-compliant informality has come
from institutional approaches that have high-
lighted the cognitive and cultural sources of norms
that explain behavioural regularity, or institutional
isomorphism, when economic rationality cannot
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). North (1991) distin-
guishes between formal and informal institutions,
but it is Scott’s (2008) identiﬁcation of three insti-
tutional pillars (cognitive, normative and regula-
tive) that has often been applied to non-compliant
informality. According to this scheme, informality
emerges through tensions between regulative insti-
tutions on one side, and cognitive and normative
processes on the other; in these cases, behaviour
that is illegal in a regulatory sense can be legitimate
in a normative one, and regulatory change is inter-
preted in speciﬁc ways often shared by employers
and employees, and therefore remains uncontested
(Webb et al., 2009). Such an approach has been ap-
plied to the informal economy not just in emerging
economies, but also in advanced economies such as
the UK to explain tax evasion through the ‘asym-
metry’ between ‘government morality’ and ‘soci-
etal morality’ (Williams andHorodnic, 2016). This
approach is relevant to small ﬁrms, which often op-
erate in local, demographic and cultural clusters,
frequently evade labour law and rely on employee
collusion.
Formal and informal institutions are mostly
placed at different levels, respectively macro and
meso, with the latter being the usual arena of
norms, values and beliefs of what is societally ac-
ceptable. Yet themeso level is broader and includes
industry-level standards, networks and customs, in
both product and labour markets (for example, on
accountants, IT/ﬁnancial services or more ﬂexible
opening times in restaurants/bars following liber-
alization).
Kloosterman (2010) shows how market insti-
tutions shape the opportunity structure in which
small ﬁrms operate. While market conditions may
be volatile (and therefore not institutions as such),
market access, intra-ﬁrm and inter-ﬁrm coordi-
nation follow not just neoclassic market rules
but, rather more often, institutionalized rules
(Fligstein, 1996). According to Kloosterman,
ﬁrms are embedded in the three levels of macro-
sphere (state regulations), mesosphere (market en-
vironment) and microsphere (social networks and
relationships within ﬁrms). As ﬁrms are not is-
lands, their internal social relations are themselves
framed by the meso-institutions, such as estab-
lished social capital networks. A crucial feature of
these networks is that they help to generate trust,
a vital element in business exchanges built on per-
sonal ties rather than legal contracts. Of particu-
lar importance is the role of the family and the
wider family strategies used to adapt to the ‘con-
straining economic, institutional, and social reali-
ties in the larger opportunity structure’ (Moen and
Wetherington, 1992: 234).
This reasoning is supported by research in the
UK (Edwards et al., 2016; Ram, Edwards and
Jones, 2007; Ram et al., 2000, 2001) showing that
adjacent and ostensibly similar businesses with
(compliant and non-compliant) informal practices
had multiple interactions with the external econ-
omy and institutions. For instance, even a clus-
ter of small businesses that could be perceived as
geographically and culturally insulated ‘enclaves’
framed by speciﬁc ethnic/cultural norms displayed
a multiplicity of signiﬁcant relations with business
institutions (such as business and consultancy net-
works) from outside the local community (Ram
and Edwards, 2010). A rigid institutional perspec-
tive would struggle to account for this multiplicity
of normative sources. A broader deﬁnition of the
mesosphere encompassing both market and cul-
tural institutions accounts more adequately for in-
formality (compliant and non-compliant).
A widely discussed limitation of institutional
approaches is how well they can explain change.
The ﬁeld of industrial relations is helpful. Terry
(1978), for example, showed that informality was
‘inevitable’ in large ﬁrms in the UK because sig-
nals from the external environment were ambigu-
ous and because the norms and rules need con-
stant reinterpretation at the micro level. Regini
(1995) dissected the changing ways in whichmicro-
level processes in Italy shaped macro inﬂuences;
for example, when macro-level formal agreement
collapsed (in the 1980s), forms of informal col-
laboration (which he called ‘micro-corporatism’)
emerged at the meso level in order to keep the
economy going. Small ﬁrms have similarities: while
their internal relations are ultimately based on
trust, they are not consensual and conﬂict-free.
The internal dynamics of these ﬁrms reﬂect their
ever-changing economic and regulatory contexts.
The lessons from these studies are threefold.
First, meso-institutions can explain the continu-
ity of informal arrangements, despite changing
regulatory and economic conditions. Second, this
C© 2019 The Author. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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continuity is not homogenous; it varies among
ﬁrms, reﬂecting the multiplicity, even within lo-
cal areas, of meso-institutions. In particular, ethnic
networks may coexist with different business net-
works, and with different sectoral norms. Third,
where change occurs, it cannot be explained by
the regulatory institutions alone, but must re-
ﬂect more speciﬁc dynamics of incremental change
in meso-institutions (e.g. liberalization or cul-
tural/demographic change in ethnic groups) and in
micro-level adjustments.
This double research puzzle – the endurance
of non-compliant informality and the sources
of change affecting meso-institutions and, poten-
tially, transitions to compliance – drives our re-
search questions on how non-compliant ﬁrms re-
act to major regulatory change. It also underpins
ourmethodological choice of longitudinal and em-
bedded case studies.
Methods
To examine howmanagers of non-compliant ﬁrms
handle regulatory change, we adopt a qualitative
case study research design comprising interviews
with 22 business owners, together with a worker in
each enterprise. The study was conducted in Birm-
ingham (the UK’s second largest city), between
2016 and 2017. Our sampling strategy is ‘purpose-
ful’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) in that the context
for the case studies – in relation to geography, sec-
tors, and communities – is one where the effects
of the NLW are likely to be particularly severe.
Birmingham faced an increase in its total wage bill
of 0.8% as a consequence of the NLW, compared
with 0.3% in London (Corlett, 2016). Recent data
from the Annual Population Survey (Office for
National Statistics, 2017) shows that employment
rates for all ethnic groups in Birmingham (52.8%)
and the West Midlands (54.9%) region are lower
than the national average (63.9%). Birmingham’s
unemployment rate is well above the national aver-
age, at 9% compared to 4.9% for thewhole country.
We chose three sectors where the NLW is
expected to ‘bite’: clothing manufacture, retail-
ing and restaurants (Table 1). Clothing is char-
acterized by asymmetric power relations be-
tween buyers and manufacturers, widespread
non-compliance and weak enforcement of regula-
tions (Hammer and Plugor, 2016). Hospitality (in-
cluding restaurants) is a low-paying service sector
in which avoidance of statutory wage rates is of-
ten noted (Ram et al., 2001). Retailing is another
classic low-paying sector, in whichmany ethnic mi-
nority andmigrant communities operate as owners
and workers (Ram, Edwards and Jones, 2007).
We focus on ﬁrms that are run by ethnic mi-
nority and migrant communities because informal
economic activity is reputed to be widespread in
such enterprises, and because these are the cases
of non-compliant informality that tend to be ex-
plained by a narrow set of normative institutions
(Darbi, Hall and Knott, 2018). As Table 1 demon-
strates, the ﬁrms are owned by established eth-
nic minority communities as well as new migrant
groups (notably Somalis). The role of family mem-
bers, either as employees or unofficial ‘helpers’,
was also a feature of the sample (see Table 2).
Fifteen of the 22 ﬁrms were investigated in
previous work. The study therefore has a lon-
gitudinal dimension which allows us to examine
whether ﬁrms escape the realms of the ‘informal
economy’. The owners, in all bar one case, were
re-interviewed. The remaining seven ﬁrms were
chosen purposefully to add diversity to the sam-
ple, and better answer the question on the kinds
of meso-institutions that are relevant for non-
compliance; for example, our three supermarkets
are signiﬁcant multisite ﬁrms, quite different in
character to the small localized shops where one
might expect non-compliant informality.
DodgeCo, SajCo and SweatCo have been inter-
viewed on at least two separate occasions in previ-
ous studies. The other 12 longitudinal cases (LO1
to LO12) were chosen from a study of the practices
of recently arrived migrant employers and their
workers conducted in 2010 (Edwards et al., 2016).
That study examined 49 business owners and 60
workers. Given the focus on non-compliance in the
present research, we chose to examine 12 ﬁrms that
failed to pay the statutory minimum wage in 2010.
The interviews with business owners revealed that
three ﬁrms (LO5, LO6 and LO9) were now com-
plying with the NLW, which allows us to examine
the processes that facilitated this transition.
The research design was subject to the uni-
versity’s peer-reviewed ethical review procedure.
Nonetheless, securing access to undertake sensitive
research (Lee, 1993) is challenging. We used three
individuals, each with their own contacts, to con-
duct the interviews. They included amember of the
research team and two freelance researchers with
experience of working with the university. This is
C© 2019 The Author. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Market and workforce characteristics of firms
Firm Sector Market position
Year
established
Employees in
2017
Ethnic origin
of owner NLW status in 2017
Previously
researched
LO1 Retail (food) Growing
(struggling in
2010)
2005 25 (15 full-time
and 10
part-time
Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO2 Retail
(clothes)
Struggling
(struggling in
2010)
2005 3 Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO3 Retail (food) Growing (stable
in 2010)
2006 4 Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO4 Retail and
money
transfer
Struggling
(struggling in
2010)
2006 4 Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO5 Retail (food) Growing (stable
in 2010)
2005 4 Somali Compliant 2009
LO6 Retail and
money
transfer
Growing (stable
in 2010)
2006 4 employees and
3 helpers
Somali Compliant 2009
LO7 Retail (IT) Stable (stable in
2010)
2006 2 employees and
2 helpers
Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO8 Retail (IT) Stable (stable in
2010)
2006 2 employees and
2 helpers
Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO9 Retail (food)
and
restaurant
Growing
(growing in
2010)
2005 13 employees (7
full-time, 3
part-time and
3 casual)
Somali Compliant 2009
LO10 Retail (food) Stable (growing
in 2010)
2005 6 (4 full-time and
2 part-time)
Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO11 Retail (food
and
clothes)
Stable (struggling
in 2010)
2009 1 FT Somali Non-compliant 2009
LO12 Restaurant Growing
(growing in
2010)
2006 Over 100 Iranian Non-compliant
(previously
non-compliant)
2009
SajCo Restaurant Struggling
(growing in
2010)
1970 6 Indian Compliant 1998, 2004
BalCo Clothing
manufac-
ture
Stable 1985 7 Indian Non-compliant
HaCo Restaurant Struggling 1998 12 Indian Non-compliant
CromCo Restaurant Stable 2005 6 Nepalese Non-compliant
DodgeCo Clothing
manufac-
ture
Struggling
(growing in
2004)
1980 2 Indian Non-compliant 1999, 2004
SweatCo Clothing
manufac-
ture
Struggling
(growing in
2004)
1982 10 Indian Non-compliant 1999, 2004
ItCo Restaurant Stable 2002 20 Indian Non-compliant
Supmkt 1 Supermarket Growing 1992 20 Pakistani Non-compliant
Supmkt 2 Supermarket Growing 1985 50–60 Pakistani Non-compliant
Supmkt 3 Supermarket Growing 2000 N/A Pakistani Non-compliant
a form of ‘chain referral sampling’ (Penrod et al.,
2003), an approach that draws respondents from
a variety of networks rather than just one (as in
the case of snowball sampling). Qualitative inter-
views were conducted with the owner and a worker
in each ﬁrm, amounting to 44 interviews. The in-
terviews established the competitive position of the
ﬁrm and examined the impact of the NLW on
relationships in the enterprise. The networks that
owners drew on for guidance on the NLW and
C© 2019 The Author. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Family and non-family workers in firms
Business Sector Family employees Family helpers Non-family employees Non-family helpers
LO1 Retail (food) YES NO YES YES
LO2 Retail (clothes) NO YES YES YES
LO3 Retail (food) NO YES YES YES
LO4 Retail and money transfer NO YES YES YES
LO5 Retail (food) NO NO YES YES
LO6 Retail and money transfer NO NO YES YES
LO7 Retail (IT) NO YES YES YES
LO8 Retail (IT) NO YES YES YES
LO9 Retail (food) and restaurant NO YES YES YES
LO10 Retail (food) NO YES YES YES
LO11 Retail (food and clothes) NO YES YES YES
LO12 Restaurant YES YES YES YES
SajCo Restaurant YES YES YES YES
DodgeCo Clothing manufacture NO YES NO YES
SweatCo Clothing manufacture YES YES YES YES
BalCo Clothing manufacture YES YES NO YES
HaCo Restaurant YES YES YES YES
CromCo Restaurant NO YES NO YES
ItCo Restaurant YES YES YES YES
Supmkt 1 Supermarket YES YES YES YES
Supmkt 2 Supermarket YES YES YES YES
Supmkt 3 Supermarket YES YES YES YES
other regulations were also investigated. Workers
were interviewed to obtain a complementary per-
spective on the impact of the NLW on working
practices.
Data analysis followed a ‘circular-spiral pattern’
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012: 28) by moving
iteratively between the 44 accounts provided by the
respondents, themes and theoretical ideas to rec-
oncile discrepancies and synthesize these themes
(Verver and Koning, 2017). We followed a four-
stage procedure, informed by Gioia, Corley and
Hamilton (2013). First, we read and re-read tran-
scripts independently to gain detailed insights of
individual accounts of the 22 ﬁrms. Next, by ap-
plying our conceptualization to the accounts, we
discussed and broadly coded a priori themes: from
non-compliance to compliance and persistent non-
compliers. At the third stage, we immersed our-
selves in the raw data in order to interrogate and
reach agreement on the central subthemes: ‘strug-
gling to survive’, ‘comfortable in their current po-
sition’ and ‘pursuing strategies of growth’. Finally,
the research team reﬂected further on the research
themes, moving holistically from the raw data, in
order to develop a coherent and overarching un-
derstanding (Corley and Gioia, 2004) of how non-
compliant ﬁrms react to major regulatory change.
We asked an experienced qualitative researcher
(not directly involved with the project) to assess
our approach. She reviewed our interview sched-
ules, a random selection of transcripts and ap-
proach to data analysis in order to assess the plau-
sibility of our conclusions.
Findings: Non-compliant ﬁrms in
motion
From non-compliance to compliance
The powerful role ascribed to meso-institutions
in accounting for non-compliance emphasizes the
enduring nature of values and norms. Our ﬁnd-
ings suggest that they can come under strain
when workers become aware of their worth and
power in the labour market, which is clearly an
effect of regulation. This was evident in the case
of the four ﬁrms (SajCo, LO5, LO6 and LO9)
that had become compliant with the NLW since
they were last studied. SajCo, an upmarket cen-
trally located curry house, accommodated previ-
ous minimumwage legislation by adopting a ‘busi-
ness as usual’ approach; that is, workers accepted
cash-in-hand payments in exchange for a relaxed,
‘give-and-take’ work environment. This changed
abruptly in 2008 with an employee’s complaint to
the tax authorities about underpayment; it was a
violation of the accepted code, and led to a
new system of written employment contracts
C© 2019 The Author. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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guaranteeing the National Minimum Wage (the
precursor to the NLW) to all workers. The norms
of loyalty and trust had been disrupted, leading
to a more instrumental approach by management.
In the owner’s view this inﬂated labour costs: ‘You
can pay someone £7.50 an hour if they’re worth it
but if they can’t even pick up a plate you’re still
paying them’. It also undermined loyalty: ‘It might
take a couple of months to train them . . . but once
you’ve taught them they bugger off’.
At the macro level, the worker’s attempt to
claim his formal entitlements was an effect of
formal regulation. With regard to the market,
compliance occurred not as a result of improved
trading conditions but, counterintuitively, during
a period of deterioration with new competitors
emerging in their inner city niche. As for the
state, compliance took place not from fear of the
regulator (who had actually given SajCo a clean
bill of health), but because of a change in the meso
level, which manifested itself as a breach of the
unwritten code of the workplace.
Unlike SajCo, other newly compliant ﬁrms –
LO5, LO6 and LO9 – had grown. LO5 diversiﬁed
his food retail and money transfer business by im-
porting ethnic clothing and perfume. LO6 intro-
duced a ‘fast food’ outlet to complement his Inter-
net cafe´ business. LO9 now comprises a restaurant,
take-away and the retailing of exotic imported
foodstuffs. It also has three other branches around
the UK. Yet dynamics within the ﬁrm, rather than
business growth or the NLW, were the triggers for
compliance:
Our internal restructuring strategy has got nothing
to dowithNLW.We complied [because of] ourmodel
of putting customers at the centre of our business
. . . I think that is what makes our rates so attractive.
(LO9)
Compliance for LO5 was a gradual affair,
prompted by a desire to be customer-centric. A fur-
ther factor was the need to retain two key workers
who threatened to leave the ﬁrm unless they were
paid the NLW. There was pressure from within the
workplace microsphere, a factor also recognized
byLO6: ‘our employeesmight quit our business for
better paying businesses elsewhere if we don’t pay
them minimum wage’ (LO6, 2017 interview). The
loyalty of these ‘star’ employees was clearly dimin-
ishing, which eventually led to the move to com-
pliance. LO9’s decision to comply was the product
of ‘long and hard thought’ and ‘advice from many
business colleagues aswell as fromour business ad-
visor’. But the switch to compliance was neither to-
tal nor permanent. Disposable cash-in-handwork-
ers (or ‘(or the continued to be used as a buffer
against trade ﬂuctuations. LO5 has ‘reduced the
number of helpers’ but continues to ‘rely on them
when we have shortage of staff’.
The adopters of the NLW highlight the impor-
tance of the three levels in our institutional per-
spective. Workers were aware of the changes at the
macro level, which in turn exposed weaknesses in
the meso-level institutional environment. In the
case of SajCo’s complainant, it showed that the
ﬁrm had employees who did not believe or adopt
norms of loyalty. The cases that adopted the NLW
to retain key workers tell a similar story: their star
employees had less fealty to traditional norms of
loyalty. Importantly, the position of employees in
the ﬁrmswas also salient: theywere skilled and val-
ued workers.
Persistent non-compliers
This category is characterized by longstanding
non-compliance and a disinclination to change.
But stylized views of ‘atypical’ management prac-
tices, ‘under the radar’ operations and limited am-
bitions are confounded by our ﬁndings. We ﬁnd
considerable heterogeneity and classify our ﬁrms
as: struggling to survive; comfortable in their cur-
rent position; and pursuing strategies of growth.
A variety of meso-level institutions inﬂuenced the
varied responses of these non-compliers. The for-
mal, macro-level regulatory environment is largely
seen as tangential. Competitive conditions, deter-
mined by changing economic institutions such as
product market standards and international trade
regimes, are important in shaping responses to
regulatory pressure, alongside normative and cog-
nitive meso-level institutions, such as family and
community norms framing labour supply. We con-
sider their inﬂuence in each category of ﬁrm.
Struggling to survive: Trapped by the market
Only three ﬁrms – LO2, LO4 and LO11 – resemble
the image of the marginalized and exploitative op-
erator. With a gross turnover of less than £10,000
p.a. in 2010, LO2 is a marginal operation, one of
the rare cases where non-compliance with NLW
is a virtual necessity for survival. As the owner
explains: ‘We pay them below the NLW because
C© 2019 The Author. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
The Roots of Informal Responses to Regulatory Change 9
the business is not generating enough proﬁt’ and
any pay rises are determined by the ﬁrm’s earnings.
LO2’s worker conﬁrms the lack of voice and bar-
gaining power: ‘We take what the employer offers
. . . I am not satisﬁed at all with the level of pay,
but there’s nothing you can do’ (LO2worker). LO4
and LO11 also struggle. LO11 complains of ex-
cessive competition, a problem aggravated by eco-
nomic recession: ‘many of our regular customers
have beenmade redundant and don’t regularly buy
goods from our shop as they used to’. Like LO2,
the owner worries about Brexit: ‘the majority of
our customers are EU nationals such as Dutch,
Italian, Spanish, Danish’. Poor revenues are again
used to justify non-compliance.
Comfortable non-compliers: Keeping it in the
family
The eight ‘comfortable non-compliers’ (LO7, LO8,
HaCo, CromCo, SweatCo, DodgeCo, BalCo,
ItCo) are content with their trading position and
have no intention of observing the NLW. The op-
portunity structure was difficult, with most own-
ers complaining of competition and experiencing
long-term decline. The role of the family, along
with the absence of workforce pressures, was cru-
cial in accommodating regulatory pressures.
HaCo and CromCo, both well-established mid-
range restaurants, operate in contrasting locations
and target different clientele: the latter nestles in a
semi-rural village with a loyal local customer base,
whilst the former taps into the busy footfall of cen-
tral Birmingham. Crucially, both rely on family
members to manage and sustain the business, as
CromCo’s owner explains: ‘My wife and son don’t
have set salaries . . . This is our livelihood, they
can’t expect a salary otherwise there wouldn’t be a
business’. During peak periods, other family mem-
bers and friends provide casual help, and ‘they get
paid for the day or week’.
A similar absence of employee pressure is en-
joyed by HaCo, where the owner’s ‘brother is the
cook, cousin is in charge of operations and nephew
is in charge of waiters’. The consequent low labour
costs, bolstered by ‘using helpers, under-recording
of hours, no contracts’ is crucial to staving off com-
petition: ‘previously we were the “go to” place in
the area if people didn’t want ﬁsh and chips, now
you can pick 10 different things’.
Similarly suffering hypercompetition is ItCo,
but here entrepreneurial initiative has created a
qualitatively different niche – customers prepared
to pay premium prices for distinctive cuisine: ‘[In
the city centre] we can attract the city folk who are
happy to pay more’ (owner, ItCo). Family mem-
bers occupy management roles and ‘are not afraid
to get their hands dirty in cleaning and waiter
work’. ItCo also beneﬁts from a worker who was
a ﬁrst-generation migrant from India. Lacking the
aspirations of the discontented workers described
earlier, he received cash in hand for a 45-hour week
but claimed to be ‘comfortable with this at the mo-
ment’ and believed he is unlikely to ‘earn the same’
elsewhere.
Social relationships in the three clothing ﬁrms
– BalCo, DodgeCo and SweatCo – were shaped
by the wider family context of the ﬁrms’ own-
ers. We have investigated DodgeCo and SweatCo
over a 20-year period, and one of the research
teamhas knownBalCo’s owner and family as long.
These ﬁrms have suffered prolonged decline, but
the owners are from affluent households and each
has decided to invest family resources into other
ventures rather than their clothing ﬁrms. Starting
in the mid-1980s, clothing wholesaler DodgeCo’s
fortunes have waxed and waned. The 1980s were
proﬁtable, with staff numbers growing from 1 to
10, turnover doubling in a matter of a few years
and a diversiﬁcation into retail. However, intense
competition in the 1990s precipitated major re-
trenchment, leaving one part-time and one full-
time worker in 2004. This tiny labour force re-
mained the same in 2017. Surviving by offering
cut-price clothing to market traders, the ﬁrm also
cut costs by employing low-aspirant migrant ca-
sual workers for peak periods: ‘If we have a big
container coming in, we’ll ﬁnd an immigrant and
pay him £10–15 to unload 100 boxes’. Sensing fur-
ther decline, the owner and his spouse have, since
2004, developed a property portfolio rather than
investing in the clothing business.
SweatCo is a family-run business that ﬁrst
opened in the early 1970s. The owner’s brother, sis-
ter, brother-in-law and cousin were amongst the
ﬁrm’s 10 employees (down from 50 in 2000). This
sharp reduction was attributed to foreign com-
petition, which prompted a switch from clothing
manufacture to importing. As the owner of this
third-generation family business remarked: ‘the
advantages [of family] are you trust them’. But suc-
cession is an issue because the proprietor’s children
were pursuing their own careers and only helped
out on an ad hoc basis. He, like DodgeCo’s owner,
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was investing in property and is likely to wind
down SweatCo in the next 5 years.
BalCo is a third-generation family business run
by the owner and his two sons. Gloomy prospects
for clothing manufacture prompted the owner to
start two new (and compliant) businesses in un-
related sectors. Manual work at Balco was under-
taken by recent migrants because: ‘immigrants . . .
have a good attitude, they’re here for the money’.
The ﬁrm operated in a shrinking market domi-
nated by small local and national ﬁrms. Coping
strategies included the use of cheapmigrant labour
and family control of management and technical
positions like social media and diversiﬁcation
Growth-oriented non-compliers: Colluding to grow
Many ﬁrms achieved remarkable levels of growth
outside formal institutions. Outstanding here is
LO1, which developed from a struggling super-
market in 2010 to a thriving concern, with a
butcher’s shop operation and recently acquired
restaurant added to the premises. The owner ex-
plained his varied portfolio:
Customers who come to the supermarket will go to
the butcher . . . , send money abroad through our
money transfer . . . It is all connected . . . and if you
are hungry . . . the restaurant is next door. (LO1)
Signiﬁcant expansion was also a feature of
Supmkt 2, a company that had six branches in dif-
ferentUKcities with plans for further acquisitions.
Despite intense competition, Supmkt 2’s longevity,
loyal customer base and purchasing power allowed
them to undercut their rivals.
A number of factors explain how these ﬁrms
achieved signiﬁcant growth whilst remaining in-
conspicuous to the authorities. First, family mem-
bers occupied key positions, particularly in the
larger multisite supermarkets. Family members in
Supmkt 3 were responsible for all management
functions, which ensured ‘ﬂexibility . . . commit-
ment . . . and . . . long term beneﬁts to the fam-
ily’. For LO10, family members ‘have a duty to . . .
work for the greater good of the family, without
expecting payment’.
Second, non-family employees, accountants and
advisers colluded to facilitate non-compliance.
In what seems a smokescreen for questionable
practices, Supmkt 2’s holding company sets pay for
the various branches:
Rates of pay are determined by the management
of the [holding company] after a recommendation
from the body . . . with the responsibility of looking
pay rates . . . Management thinks if we comply with
NLW we will lose jobs.
This widespread tendency of non-compliant
ﬁrms to seek external expertise from accountants
and external advisors is noteworthy. LO1 – ‘com-
fortable with . . . informal advice’ in 2010 – now
looked to his accountant to guide him on theNLW
and other issues. The owner relied on friends and
family in 2010 because of his unfamiliarity with
the UK business environment. In 2017, he used ac-
countants because ‘as the business grows, you need
to show . . . good practice’. It appears that they are
being used to sustain non-compliance rather than
ensure regulatory conformance.
Third, the veneer of formality is facilitated by
selective compliance: full-time workers were now
paid the NLW, but less well-remunerated helpers
remained integral to the ﬁrms.
[Helpers] are important because they can help car-
rying/loading the fresh fruits/groceries pallets day in
day out, . . . Employees . . . are paid either weekly
or monthly, whilst helpers . . . are paid [on the day].
(LO1)
Nonetheless, awareness of the NLW amongst
some key workers put a strain on the business. Cit-
ing the example of three recent recruits, LO1 com-
plained:
We trained them in hygiene, health and safety and
they got certiﬁcates. However, they [soon] left to
work for another business with better pay and con-
ditions. (LO1)
The owner also felt that regulations forced
him to pay decent wages to undeserving workers:
‘Some . . . don’t have basic customer care skills
and attitudes and we had to sack them to maintain
[our] reputation’.
If owners like these are to comply, pressures
are likely to come from the workplace as much as
the regulatory macrosphere. Despite recent moves
by the state to crack down on non-compliers,
owners seem oblivious to the threat. They are
more likely to feel pressured internally because the
traditional workplace, populated by easily satis-
ﬁed ﬁrst-generation migrants, is dwindling. Hence
there is a rising sense of dissatisfaction among
the present cohort of workers, as exempliﬁed by
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Meena, an assistant manager at Supmkt 2, who
worked a 50-hour week:
I am not satisﬁed with my pay [£7.40 per hour] due
to the rising cost of living. My salary is not reﬂected
in my duties . . . I have a young family . . . [I]t’s not
enough at all to make ends meet.
Employee discontent is evident in other ﬁrms
too, and most complained of a lack of inﬂuence
over pay and working conditions. Many workers
felt resigned to their fate. LO12’s worker, who was
paid below the NLW, explains:
Our pay has remained the same for several years;
only the manager can increase our pay . . . Pay in-
creases are not awarded fairly . . . Employees don’t
have any inﬂuence.
Discussion
Our research aimed to explore how managers of
non-compliant ﬁrms respond to major regula-
tory change, notably the NLW. The institutional
asymmetry perspective associated withWebb et al.
(2009) has advanced management scholarship by
highlighting the importance of informal institu-
tions, but the dynamics of actually managing
non-compliant ﬁrms remain elusive (Darbi, Hall
and Knott, 2018). Our cases, focusing on ‘non-
compliant informality’, appear to be suggestive of
homogeneity since they operate in low-paying sec-
tors where non-compliant informality is particu-
larly prevalent, are located in a geographically dis-
crete area, and are owned and staffed by ethnic
minority groups. But we ﬁnd a considerable va-
riety of practice, a ﬂuid relationship between for-
mal and informal institutions, and tensions within
ﬁrms. That such a ﬁnding is surprising within
the domains of ‘mainstream’ management and en-
trepreneurship studies is perhaps an indication of
their closeness to economics. Godfrey (2016) be-
lieves that such a link reﬂectsmanagement scholar-
ship’s conﬂation of formality with progress, whilst
Baker and Welter (2018) see a connection between
economists’ domination of the entrepreneurship
domain and their lingering preoccupation with the
innovative and job-creation potential of a nar-
row band of rapid-growth ‘gazelles’. Drawing on
rich empirical evidence informed by economic and
industrial sociology (Castells and Portes, 1989;
Edwards et al., 2006; Ram and Edwards, 2003,
2010), we advance management scholarship on
the informal economy in two ways. First, we in-
clude the institutional market environment and
wider opportunity structures (Kloosterman, 2010)
within the range of meso-institutions that inﬂu-
ence the informal economy. Importantly, ﬁrm sec-
tor shapes the scope for informality (compliant
and non-compliant), as well as determining the
overall conditions faced by the ﬁrm (Arrowsmith
et al., 2003). Second, we demonstrate that micro-
level analysis needs attention too, because social
relations within the ﬁrm mediate the effects of ex-
ternal inﬂuences. Small ﬁrms are not wholly in-
sulated from external inﬂuences (Edwards et al.,
2006). This integrated approach views context
as multilayered and inﬂuenced by the cognitions
and actions of entrepreneurs and the people with
whom they interact (Baker and Welter, 2018: 386).
The various elements of our integrated institu-
tional perspective help to explain how managers
responded to economic and regulatory change.
First, the tough trading environment generated
pressures to contain costs and limited managers’
capacity to absorb the expense of regulatory com-
pliance. Restauranteurs and retailers made re-
peated reference to the ‘cut-throat’ nature of the
competition and ‘trying to outdo one another’.
Survival for clothing employers relied on price-
cutting, sourcing cheap imports and a retreat from
manufacturing. The signiﬁcance of this approach
is that the impact of regulations will be felt differ-
ently in different competitive circumstances, hence
the theoretical importance of encompassing the
product market in assessments of meso-level insti-
tutions.
Second, at the meso level, a source of labour
based on community, family and kinship ties al-
lows managers to compete. Workers’ reluctance to
challenge non-compliant employers is shaped by
the paternalistic bargain, which is rooted in fa-
milial and community links. Workers’ acceptance
of the situation is not solely a matter of exploita-
tion and silent resentment. Some workers appre-
ciate the opportunities they have, while others are
aware of the ﬁnancial pressures facing ﬁrms. There
is thus acceptance and accommodation rather than
overt resistance. But employers also ‘get away’
with non-compliance because of the dependency,
vulnerability and liminality of certain employees.
The latter are the outcome of wider historical and
geopolitical forces, rather than unrestrained man-
agerial agency. There also continues to be a
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supply of labour, of illegal or undocumented work-
ers, and such supply may become increasingly im-
portant if the pool of legal migrant labour is re-
stricted after Brexit. But new generations, and
migrant workers after settling, can become more
proactive and assertive in their wage demands, in
knowledge of their rights and in their capacity to
use the ‘exit’ strategy to force employers into pay-
ing higher rates.
Non-compliant ﬁrms survive, and sometimes
grow, with the support of formal regulatory agents
like accountants and business advisers. Small busi-
ness owners, particularly migrant ﬁrms of the kind
reported on here (Ram and Edwards, 2010), tend
to eschew formal sources of business support. The
widespread tendency of ﬁrms to seek external ex-
pertise in the present study is therefore surpris-
ing. Accountants appear to be facilitating non-
compliance: ‘We are not the only one that are
not complying . . . Our accountants are also aware
of our non-compliance’ (LO4). The inﬂuence of
accountants and other professional accomplices
helps to explain why non-compliant entrepreneurs
in mature economies are ‘willing to incur the le-
gal risk and how they are able to grow ventures
outside of formal institutions’ (Webb, Ireland and
Ketchen, 2014: 8). It appears that these profession-
als are instrumental in helping managers to de-
cide the ‘optimal’ degree of formality and navigate
the intricacies of formal institutions (Skousen and
Mahoney, 2016).
A number of wider implications can be iden-
tiﬁed, which include the value of industrial
sociology, the ‘impact’ of regulations and the link
between managerial agency and the employment
relationship. A key contribution is the value
of an industrial sociology perspective to the
enrichment of institutional approaches to the
informal economy. Although institutional theory
offers a ‘common language’ for scholars, greater
‘interdisciplinary efforts [are] needed to tackle
the sort of complex issues posed by the informal
economy’ (Ketchen et al., 2014: 97). Industrial
sociology is helpful in explaining the mechanisms
that (re)produce informality, particularly in its
insistence on sector and business networks as key
meso-level institutions. Sociologically informed
analysis draws attention to sectoral norms; the
often local and highly speciﬁc character of the
markets engaged by small ﬁrms (compliant and
non-compliant) and the ‘entrepreneurial effect’
of different levels of management expertise,
experience, strategies and access to capital (Ar-
rowsmith et al., 2003). These factors combine
to shape responses to regulatory change and
demonstrate the ‘conﬂuence of formal and infor-
mal institutions’ (Webb and Ireland, 2016: 32).
Our study of long-term non-compliance and, in
some cases, transitions to compliance is grounded
in the sociological tradition. Its contribution is
to provide a more longitudinal perspective on
the complex and dynamic relationships between
institutional factors and informality. It provides a
granular picture of the mechanisms in action by
adopting a perspective that has the potential to
enrich prevailing institutional approaches.
Our perspective also informs debates on the
‘impact’ of regulations on non-compliant ﬁrms.
Sociologically based studies (Edwards, Ram and
Black, 2002; Edwards et al., 2002; Kitching, 2016;
Ram, Edwards and Jones, 2007) question the
notion of a direct effect of regulations, and suggest
that outcomes vary over time, are dependent on
social relationships within the ﬁrm and are shaped
by external stakeholders (Kitching, 2016). Our
longitudinal analysis shows these processes at
work. Non-compliant employers’ discovery of
regulations was shaped by social interactions with
external networks. The surprisingly prevalent use
of accountants and business advisers casts light on
how non-compliers learnt about regulations, and
in many cases developed strategies to evade them.
The latter point is important in understanding
how ‘successful’ (large or growing) non-compliant
ﬁrms handle institutional pluralism or ‘poly-
centricity’ (that is, simultaneous engagement in
multiple institutional domains; see Webb and Ire-
land, 2016). Some (DeCastro, Khavul and Bruton,
2014; Ketchen et al., 2014) see the greater engage-
ment with macro-institutions as ﬁrms become
successful as a challenge to their embeddedness
in meso-institutions; our study suggests that such
institutional pluralism can be compatible and mu-
tually reinforcing. The pattern of social relations
(or implicit bargaining) within the ﬁrm and with
key business networks is of central importance
in handling the potentially competing ‘logics’
of different institutional domains. When social
relations are disrupted – as we saw with SajCo
and the threat of some skilled workers leaving
the ﬁrm – regulatory change is likely to be more
keenly felt.
The importance of temporally sensitive analy-
sis to assessing the ‘impact’ of regulations is also
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evident. Speculation abounds on the permanence
of the informal economy and its susceptibility to
regulatory change (De Castro, Khavul and Bru-
ton, 2014; Welter et al., 2015). Too often: ‘stud-
ies . . . ignore the temporal speciﬁcity of regulatory
burdens, implicitly treating them as invariant over
time’ (Kitching, 2016: 603). Timematters, and lon-
gitudinal analysis is needed to grasp the complex
and contextually speciﬁc dynamics of formaliza-
tion and/or continued non-compliance.
Finally, we develop the link between managerial
agency and the employment relationship. We have
drawn attention to the central role that social
relations between owners and workers play in
shaping responses to regulatory change. Inﬂu-
ences from macro and meso-level institutions were
mediated by the structures and traditions of the
workplace. Institutional approaches emphasize
‘informal adjustments’ (Godfrey, 2016; Webb and
Ireland, 2016), but regard this as ‘norms, values,
and beliefs [that] become the basis for collectively
shared rules’ (Webb and Ireland, 2016: 23) rather
than the trade-offs that characterize competing
interests in the workplace (Edwards et al., 2006).
Three points are worth emphasizing.
First, it is important to recognize familial and
other networks in which non-compliant ﬁrms are
often embedded. As we saw in a number of cases,
managerial agency could only be understood as
part of an overarching ‘household’ strategy that
encompassed a range of diverse activities outside
the conﬁnes of the non-compliant ﬁrm. Within
the ﬁrm, family members tend to occupy man-
agerial positions, which facilitates non-compliant
activity. Familial relations provided an important
source of ﬂexibility for workers and managers,
and shaped approaches to organizational prac-
tices such as recruitment and management of the
enterprise.
Second, the internal inequalities and abuses we
uncovered caution against an uncomplicated link
between meso-institutions and notions of shared
norms.Managers in non-compliant ﬁrms often ex-
ploit personal relationships and networks of vul-
nerable workers. This can create a situation of in-
debtedness and resignation rather than workplace
harmony. The sociological concept of compet-
ing interests – elicited by incorporating workers’
voices – guards against the unitarist portrayal of
meso-level actors and institutions. It aids the goal
of contextualization by recognizing the ‘dynamics
of power, domination, oppression, inequality and
violence’ (Baker and Welter, 2018: 401) often ne-
glected in extant studies.
Third, we show that workers are not passive
recipients of managerial control even in ﬁrms in
which owners have seemingly little constraint on
their prerogative. Owners faced the contradictory
pressures of a competitive and price-sensitive mar-
ket, a restricted pool of labour and reliance on
highly skilled workers. The NLW helped some
workers to take advantage of this set of circum-
stances (which are again illuminated by sociolog-
ical analysis).
Conclusions
Managers of non-compliant ﬁrms are emboldened
by the absence of effective external deterrence from
the state. Despite the state’s enhanced rhetorical
commitment to enforcement, the risks of being pe-
nalized are low. There is a gap between the en-
actment of regulations and their practical enforce-
ment. Not only can enforcement be difficult, with
government agencies struggling to plug loopholes,
but the will to enforce may itself be weak or non-
existent. This could be due to passive bystanding,
or tacit encouragement (since informal economic
activity can be viewed as ameans of generating em-
ployment and self-employment among otherwise
socially excluded sections of the population, often
in decaying urban areas).
At least three approaches can be suggested in re-
lation to ﬁrms of the kind reported here. First, at-
tack the cases of clear exploitation, as they tend
to be deemed illegitimate even by informal nor-
mative meso-institutions – the asymmetry is there-
fore narrower. Second, identify and support ﬁrms
which are actively seeking formalization (like those
that have moved into compliance in our sample)
by strengthening those meso-institutions (e.g. lo-
cal employer associations) that can support both
compliance and business survival. Third, provide
forms of labour empowerment (through mecha-
nisms of voice, better employment security and
employment advice centres) that can support em-
ployees in claiming their rights. These approaches
are ambitious given the durability of the informal
economic activity in the UK, but not impossible
given the occurrence (albeit rare) of transition to
formality and the potential for changing a set of
meso, normative institutions that are far less ho-
mogenous and intractable than often assumed.
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Our theoretical and empirical insights can be de-
veloped further in two ways. First, the particular
dimension along which ﬁrms in the economy vary
can be calibrated more precisely. We have iden-
tiﬁed some inﬂuences (for example, product and
labour markets), but this can be added to, perhaps
drawing on the models of Darbi, Hall and Knott
(2018) and Edwards et al. (2006). They could also
lend themselves to quantitative research, measur-
ing inﬂuences like the degree of family control. Sec-
ond, extending this line of research to non-migrant
ﬁrms beyond the ‘ethnic economy’ would widen
the applicability of the approach we have adopted.
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